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Abstract 
 
The use of machine learning (ML) is on the rise in many sectors of software development, and 
automotive software development is no different. In particular, Advanced Driver Assistance 
Systems (ADAS) and Automated Driving Systems (ADS) are two areas where ML plays a 
significant role. In automotive development, safety is a critical objective, and the emergence of 
standards such as ISO 26262 has helped focus industry practices to address safety in a systematic 
and consistent way. Unfortunately, these standards were not designed to accommodate 
technologies such as ML or the type of functionality that is provided by an ADS and this has 
created a conflict between the need to innovate and the need to improve safety. In this report, we 
take steps to address this conflict by doing a detailed assessment and adaption of ISO 26262 for 
ML, specifically in the context of supervised learning. First we analyze the key factors that are 
the source of the conflict. Then we assess each software development process requirement (Part 
6 of ISO 26262) for applicability to ML. Where there are gaps, we propose new requirements to 
address the gaps. Finally we discuss the application of this adapted and extended variant of Part 
6 to ML development scenarios.   
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1 Introduction 
 
The use of machine learning (ML) is on the rise in many sectors of software development, and 
automotive software development is no different. In particular, Advanced Driver Assistance 
Systems (ADAS) and Automated Driving Systems (ADS) are two areas where ML plays a 
significant role [33, 18]. In automotive development, safety is a critical objective, and the 
emergence of standards such as ISO 26262 [16] has helped focus industry practices to address 
safety in a systematic and consistent way. Unfortunately, these standards were not designed to 
accommodate technologies such as ML or the type of functionality that is provided by an ADS 
and this has created a tension between the need to innovate and the need to improve safety. 
 
In response to this issue, research has been active in several areas. Recently, the safety of ML 
approaches in general have been analyzed both from theoretical [38] and pragmatic perspectives 
[1]. However, most research is specifically about neural networks (NN). Work on supporting the 
verification & validation (V&V) of NNs emerged in the 1990's with a focus on making their 
internal structure easier to assess by extracting representations that are more understandable [36]. 
General V&V methodologies for NNs have also been proposed [24, 28]. More recently, with the 
popularity of deep neural networks (DNN), verification research has included more diverse 
topics such as generating explanations of DNN predictions [12], improving the stability of 
classification [14] and property checking of DNNs [17]. 
 
Despite their challenges, NNs are already used in high assurance systems (see [30] for a survey), 
and safety certification of NNs has received some attention. Pullum et al. [27] give detailed 
guidance on V&V as well as other aspects of safety assessment such as hazard analysis with a 
focus on adaptive systems in the aerospace domain. Bedford et al. [2] define general 
requirements for addressing NNs in any safety standard. Kurd et al. [19] have established criteria 
for NNs to use in a safety case. 
 
The recent surge of interest in ADSs has also been driving research in certification. Koopman 
and Wagner [18] identify some of the key challenges to certification, including ML. Martin et al. 
[20] analyze the adequacy of ISO 26262 [16] for an ADS but focus on the impact of the 
increased complexity it creates rather than specifically the use of ML. Spanfelner et al. [33] 
assess ISO 26262 from the perspective of driver assistance systems. Burton et al. [7] explore the 
kind of safety case that is required for an ADS that uses ML components. Finally, in earlier work 
[92] we analyze the compatibility of ISO 26262 with ML and make recommendations on how to 
improve compatibility. The current report builds on and significantly extends this work.   
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In this report, we take steps to address the conflict between ISO 26262 and ML. First we analyze 
the key factors that are the source of the conflict. Then we do a detailed assessment and adaption 
of ISO 26262 for ML.  Specifically, our contributions are as follows: 
 We assess every software development process requirement (Part 6 of ISO 26262) for 
applicability to ML and discuss related relevant current research.  
 Where there are gaps in the requirements because of the unique characteristics of ML, we 
propose new requirements to address the gaps.  
 We discuss the application of this adapted and extended variant of Part 6 to ML 
development scenarios.   
 
While the focus of this report is on supervised learning many of the findings and proposals are 
applicable to other forms of ML.  
 
The remainder of the report is structured as follows. In Sec. 2 we give the required background 
on current software safety assurance approaches. In Sec. 3, we discuss the obstacles that using 
ML-based software creates.  Then in Sec. 4, we outline a methodology based on ISO 26262 that 
addresses these obstacles and detail this in Sec. 5 through Sec. 8. Sec. 9 gives a summary of the 
proposals and discusses application scenarios. Conclusions are given in Sec. 10. 
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2 Background 
 
In this section, we review the currently accepted approach to safety assurance of automotive 
software. Safety in automotive development follows a similar approach to other safety-critical 
domains such as aeronautics, railways, nuclear power, etc. The prominent automotive standard 
ISO 26262 [16] for functional safety (FuSa) addresses unsafe system behaviours caused by 
malfunctions of the system. This is the automotive specialization of the more generic FuSa safety 
standard IEC 61508. The new automotive standard ISO/AWI PAS 21148 [15] currently under 
development addresses unsafe system behaviours caused by the intended functionality of the 
system (SOTIF) – i.e., when no malfunction has occurred. In both standards there is a similar 
safety lifecycle that defines the activities required to assure safety in the development process. In 
this report, we use the safety lifecycle shown in Figure 2.1 extracted from ISO 26262 that 
focusses on the software development aspects of automotive development.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Safety lifecycle as it relates to software development. 
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ISO 26262 defines safety as "absence of unreasonable risk" [16, Part 1] and this is made concrete 
in term of hazards and safety goals. A hazard is a system event or state (e.g., following a vehicle 
too closely) that can potentially cause crashes. For functional safety, the hazards are limited to 
system malfunctions (e.g., sensor failure). SOTIF extends ISO26262 to address performance 
limitations, in particular those caused by limitations of sensors and algorithms (including ML-
based algorithms), and foreseeable misuse. The safety lifecycle begins with a hazard analysis and 
risk assessment (HARA) in which hazards are identified and the risk of these hazards assessed. 
Then, top level safety requirements called safety goals are identified that mitigate the hazards. 
These are then successively refined, first as functional requirements, then as technical 
requirements and finally as hardware and software requirements.  
 
The approach to assuring safety-critical software in ISO 26262 can be summarized as the 
following safety assurance principle (SAP): 
 
 (SAP) By developing software using an adequate level of rigor, the residual risk of 
hazard due to software failure can be reduced to an acceptable level. 
 
ISO 26262 Part 6 realizes the SAP by specifying the process requirements for the needed level of 
development rigor to develop the software for a function. SOTIF considers the performance 
limitations at the hazard analysis and safety concept level (mostly by suggesting specific classes 
of limitations that should be used as triggers in scenarios, and then using specific testing 
techniques for vehicle level and field testing), but not at software level. In other words, SOTIF 
does not address the specific requirements to be used as part of software development as in Part 
6 of ISO 262620. Although our focus in this report is on ISO 26262 Part 6, the concepts readily 
extend to the cases covered by SOTIF.  
 
The level of rigor required for the function is geared toward the risk associated with the function 
as measured by its Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL), a risk classification scheme 
defined in ISO 26262 for safety requirements. The ASIL represents the degree of rigor required 
(e.g., testing techniques used, types of documentation produced, etc.) in ensuring the safety 
requirement is satisfied in order to reduce the risk of the hazard to an acceptable level. ASIL D 
represents the highest and ASIL A the lowest risk. QM (Quality Management) indicates that a 
safety requirement does not require safety management. The ASIL assessed for a given hazard is 
first assigned to the safety goal set to address the hazard and is then inherited by the safety 
requirements derived from that goal. 
 
Once the safety requirements are refined to the software level, the development process follows 
the standard V model (Lower part of Figure 2.1). This provides two types of assurance that the 
safety requirements are satisfied at each phase of development. First, verification methods are 
used to assess correctness of the refinement at each design phase with the specification in the 
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previous design phase. Second, testing methods are used as an assessment of each design phase, 
both to support verification and, at higher levels of integration, for validation. Note that the 
safety requirements of a software component only represent a subset of its full requirements. 
Thus, for safety assurance, we limit the focus of verification and testing to assuring the safety 
requirements.  
 
ISO 26262 also requires design and coding best practices to be used within design phases as well 
as fault tolerance strategies in the architecture. Table 2.1 shows an overview of the 83 software 
methods required by ISO 26262. The degree of recommendation for a given method is dependent 
on the ASIL level of the corresponding functionality (See Appendix A for examples).  
 
 
Table 2.1 Required software methods for ISO 26262 [16, Part 6]. 
Category of Method Number of 
Methods 
Description 
Coding guidelines 8 Coding standards to improve consistency and 
comprehension. 
Architecture notations 3 Degrees of formality in design notation. 
Architecture design 7 Design best practices to manage complexity.  
Architecture error detection 6 Error detection methods for fault tolerance. 
Architecture error handling 4 Error recovery methods for fault tolerance. 
Architecture verification 7 Methods of verification against safety 
requirements. 
Unit design notations 4 Degrees of formality in design notation. 
Unit design and implementation 10 Design and coding best practices to manage 
complexity. 
Unit design and implementation  
verification 
8 Methods of verification against safety 
requirements. 
Unit testing 5 Types of unit testing. 
Unit deriving test cases 4 Deriving test cases from requirements. 
Unit testing coverage metrics 3 Code coverage of test cases. 
Integration testing  5 Types of integration testing. 
Integration deriving test cases 4 Deriving test cases from requirements. 
Integration testing coverage 
metrics 
2 Architecture coverage of test cases. 
Verification of software safety 
requirements 
3 System level testing to ensure the embedded 
software satisfies safety requirements. 
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Each of the methods in Table 2.1 is intended to contribute to reducing faults in the software and 
thus the methods can be summarized in terms of how they address faults. This is shown in Table 
2.2.  
 
Table 2.2 How methods address faults. 
Type of method How it addresses faults 
Best practice Prevent faults. 
Verification Find and repair faults. 
Testing 
Fault tolerance Live with faults and prevent them from causing 
failures. 
 
 
An important output of the safety lifecycle is a safety case. The safety case is an explicitly 
documented argument showing that the different steps in the safety lifecycle have been followed 
with adequate rigor. This includes the list of the hazards, the list of safety goals to mitigate the 
hazards, the safety requirement refinement path from safety goals and finally the results of 
verification and testing methods providing the evidence that the requirements are adequately 
satisfied by the implementation. Thus, the safety case gives a clear traceability path from the 
implemented software to the hazards. In addition, the safety case contains arguments to show 
that the set of hazards and safety requirements is adequately complete. 
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3 Automation and ML: Obstacles to Safety Assurance of Software  
 
In the same way that traditional programmed software can have bugs and hence, has an “error 
rate”, an ML model typically does not operate perfectly and exhibits some error rate. However, 
note that the SAP does not focus on explicitly measuring and reducing error rates. Instead, it 
focuses on the development rigor needed to reduce the error rate to an acceptable level. For ML-
based software, we discuss two key obstacles to realizing the SAP: lack of specifications and 
non-interpretability. 
 
3.1 (O1) Lack of specification 
 
Spanfelner et al. [33] point out that many kinds of advanced functionality (e.g., autonomous 
driving) require perception of the environment, and this functionality may not be completely 
specifiable. For example, what is the specification for recognizing a pedestrian? Since a vehicle 
must move around in a human world, advanced functionality must involve perception of human 
categories (e.g., pedestrians). There is evidence that such categories can only partially be 
specified using rules (e.g., necessary and sufficient conditions) and also need examples [29].  
 
The fact that functionality like perception is difficult to specify has motivated the use of ML-
based approaches for implementing software components by training from examples instead of 
programming from a specification. However, a lack of a specification is an obstacle to safety 
assurance. There is an assumption in ISO 26262, given by the left side of the V model (Figure 
2.1), that the safety requirements of a component are completely specified and each refinement 
can be verified with respect to its specification [33]. Note that this assumption is also made in 
other safety-critical domains such as aerospace [3]. This is important in order to ensure that the 
safety case can trace the behaviour of the implementation to its design, safety requirements and 
ultimately, to the hazards that are mitigated.  
 
A training set is not an adequate substitute for a specification. The training set is necessarily 
incomplete and there is no guarantee that it is even representative of the space of possible inputs. 
In contrast, a characteristic of a specification that makes it valuable for safety assurance is that it 
says something about a (potentially infinite) set of input/output cases. Thus, with a training set, it 
is not clear how to create assurance that the corresponding hazards are always mitigated. 
Furthermore, the training process cannot be considered to be equivalent to a verification process 
since the trained model will be “correct by construction" with respect to the training set, up to the 
limits of the model and the learning algorithm.  
 
Other problems with a training based approach include the following: learning may overfit a 
model by capturing details incidental to the training set or training environment rather than 
general to all possible inputs in the operational environment [7]; even if the training set is 
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representative, it may under-represent the safety-critical cases because these are often rarer in the 
input space [38]; and, the underlying distribution of inputs in the operational environment may 
drift from that of the training set over time [7]. Although there has been significant effort to 
address these problems, they are still unsolved in general. Thus, the uncertainty that these 
problems create about how an ML component will behave is a threat to safety. 
 
 
3.2 (O2) Non-interpretability 
 
All types of ML models contain knowledge in an encoded form, but this encoding is more 
interpretable by humans in some types of models than others. Bayesian Networks are 
interpretable since the nodes are random variables and can represent human-defined concepts. 
For example, a Bayesian Network for weather prediction may have nodes such as “precipitation 
type", “temperature", etc. In contrast, NN models are considered non-interpretable and 
significant research effort has been devoted to making them more interpretable and we briefly 
review this research in Sec. 3.4. Increasing ML model expressive power is typically at the 
expense of interpretability but some research efforts focus on mitigating this [13].  
 
Non-interpretability is an obstacle to safety assurance because it prevents the use of manual 
white box verification methods such as inspection and walkthroughs, but it is also relevant for 
other activities such as formal verification or static analysis where an understanding of the 
implementation is needed to interpret the results. This is particularly important when a 
requirements specification is available, but it is still relevant when one is not available. For 
example, a human doing a walkthrough of a trained pedestrian classifier can still identify “bad 
logic” without a specification because all humans are subject matter experts on pedestrian 
recognition.  
 
3.3 Impact of lack of specifications and non-interpretability 
 
 
If we consider Table 2.2, it is clear that even though best practices are important and fault 
tolerance techniques can help compensate for faulty components, verification and testing are the 
“heart and soul” of safety assurance as they are core components of the V model (Figure 2.1). 
However, the lack of specification and non-interpretability has a direct impact on the ability to 
do verification and testing. Table 3.1 quantifies this impact on the software methods 
recommended in ISO 26262. The score in each cell indicates the weighted fraction of the 
methods (verification or testing) that are applicable if the condition in the left column holds, 
averaged over the four ASILs. Specifically, for each condition and type of method (verification 
or testing), first the score 𝑆(𝑎) is computed using Eqn (1) for ASIL 𝑎 where 𝑀 is the set of 
software methods of the given type,  𝐶(𝑚) is 1 (otherwise, 0) if the condition holds for the 
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method and 𝑅(𝑚, 𝑎) is the degree of recommendation (1 for recommended and 2 for highly 
recommended) for the method and ASIL (See Appendix A).  
 
                                                            𝑆(𝑎) = ∑ ஼(௠)∗ோ(௠,௔)೘∈ಾ∑ ோ(௠,௔)೘∈ಾ                                                        (1) 
 
The score in the cell is the average of 𝑆(𝑎) over the four ASILs and the number in parentheses is 
the standard deviation. This is included only to show that it is small, so that the average score is 
representative of the four ASILs. 
 
Table 3.1 Impact score of lack of specification and non-interpretability on verification and 
testing. 
Condition Verification Testing 
No specification available 
Implementation is interpretable 
0.50  
(0.0) 
0.52  
(0.03) 
Specification is available 
Implementation is not interpretable 
0.26 
(0.01) 
0.97 
(0.01) 
 
The scores show that half the methods are eliminated for both verification and testing if no 
specification is available but the implementation is interpretable. When we assume that there is 
no interpretability, three quarters of the methods are eliminated for verification but testing is only 
slightly impacted. We can conclude that having a specification is important for both verification 
and testing and interpretability is critical for verification. This suggests that ISO 26262 style 
approach to realizing the SAP can only be achieved for ML-based software if these two obstacles 
are addressed. 
 
3.4 Addressing the obstacles 
We consider how the impact of these obstacles can be mitigated. Although obstacle O1 may not 
be completely addressable, we propose that it can be partially addressed by re-thinking the kinds 
of specification used for ML components. This is discussed in detail in Section 6. 
 
As discussed above, addressing obstacle O2 is the subject of active research and we briefly 
review this here. The issue of interpretability can either be global when applied to the entire 
trained model or local when applied to individual inferences made by the model [71]. At the 
global level, interpretability can be achieved by having a transparent model that is directly 
interpretable or indirectly through subsequent post-hoc descriptions that explain the model [72]. 
The latter approach is used at the local level as well. As discussed above, some general model 
types, such as Bayesian networks are recognized as being more transparent than others as are 
more specialized model types such as Deformable Part Models [62]. Others, such as decision 
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trees or linear models can be transparent but become less so as the dimensionality increases or 
use engineered features with no simple intuitive meaning [72].  
 
The focus of the research on non-transparent model types such as NNs or SVMs is on creating 
useful post hoc descriptions. At the global level, for NN’s this direction includes network 
visualizations (e.g., [77], [82]) or extracting a transparent approximation such as a decision tree 
(e.g., [78]), or a set of decision rules [36, 79].   Another approach is to shed light on the 
behaviour of an ML component by showing the dependence of outputs on inputs. These include 
sensitivity analysis (e.g., [80]) and partial dependence plots (e.g., [81]).   
 
For local post hoc descriptions, the focus is on explaining a particular prediction. An important 
class of approaches attempts to show the relative importance of the input features responsible for 
the prediction (e.g., a bar graph of features, a heat map over the input image, etc.). There are 
DNN specific approaches (e.g., [87]) and newer model agnostic approaches [85, 86]. Text based 
explanations produce natural language explanations of the model predictions. Here we 
differentiate between introspective explanations that describe the actual reasoning of the model 
vs. justifications that are learned descriptions about how a human might justify the prediction 
based on the features (e.g., [12]). While justifications may be easier to understand for non-
technical users, they cannot be used as basis for assurance because they do not reflect the actual 
internal process of the trained model. Thus, introspective explanations are what are required for 
safety assurance. Finally, in a recent paper, Weld and Bansal [73] point out that interactive 
dialogs, where the user can ask questions about a prediction, are more effective than fixed 
generated explanations. 
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4 ISO 26262 Analysis Approach 
 
ISO 26262 realizes the SAP for software by specifying various development requirements but 
the standard was developed with the intent that software would be created through programming 
(or code generation using model-based development). In this report, we attempt to “fit” these 
requirements to ML in order to produce an approach for the assurance of safety-critical ML-
based software. Specifically, we use the following steps: 
 For each requirement specified in ISO 26262 Part 6 for software,  
o The requirement is restated 1  (italics are used) and interpreted for ML-based 
software. 
o The degree to which it is applicable is assessed and where possible, we 
recommend accommodations for the points of non-applicability.  
 Any additional requirements are identified (i.e., gaps) that are relevant for ML-based 
software but do not correspond to an existing ISO 26262 requirement. 
 
We scope these steps as follows: 
 All requirements of Part 6 are considered, but the only ones that are explicitly discussed 
in this report are those where there are special considerations for the applicability of the 
requirement to ML-based software. 
 We assume that ML is only used to implement individual software components and not 
entire subsystems. That is, a subsystem is considered to be “traditional” in the sense that 
it is an explicitly designed architecture consisting of components with well-defined 
functionality connected to each other. This is in contrast to the end-to-end (e.g., [4]) uses 
of ML where a complex relation between sensor inputs and actuator outputs is directly 
learned from training examples.   
 
Based on these considerations, Table 4.1 lists the subsections of Part 6 that are explicitly 
discussed in this report. 
 
Table 4.1 Subsections of ISO 26262 Part 6 discussed in this report. 
Subsection Title 
5 Initiation of product development at the software level 
6 Specification of software safety requirements 
7 Software architectural design 
(analysis of this section is limited to Fault Tolerance methods) 
8 Software unit design and implementation 
9 Software unit testing 
                                                 
1 In some cases the requirement refers to a table which is also reproduced; however, since the table numbering is 
different in this report than in ISO 26262, both table numbers are specified. 
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These ISO 26262 subsections are addressed in the subsequent subsections of this report. For each 
report subsection, we include subsubsections titled “Process requirements” that describe the 
results of the assessment.  
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5 (ISO Subsection 5) Initiation of product development at the software 
level 
 
5.1 Process requirements 
5.1.1 ML development decision gate 
 
Due to the low level of maturity of ML-based components and obstacles O1 and O2, we propose 
a new requirement to assess the necessity of using ML to implement safety requirements. This is 
a “decision gate” for moving ahead with development using ML. The key criterion here is the 
specifiability of the safety requirement. If it can be completely specified, a traditional 
programming approach to implementing the requirement is possible and should be taken. Thus, 
we add the following process requirement. 
 
(Req MLIN1) An assessment shall be performed to determine whether the safety requirement 
must be implemented by an ML-component or can acceptably be implemented using a 
programmed component. If the latter case holds then programming shall be used rather than 
ML.  
 
For example, if the safety requirement is to “detect all pedestrians within 10 meters”, this is not 
completely specifiable because it is unclear what the complete set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions are for identifying what a pedestrian is. On the other hand, the safety requirement 
“detect obstacles within 10 meters” could be precisely specified and implemented using 
programming because obstacle detection can be performed with an appropriate combination of 
sensors (e.g., LIDAR, RADAR, etc.) and signal processing. 
 
Different strategies are possible for “containing” safety requirements that are not completely 
specifiable. If a component has multiple safety requirements and some are completely 
specifiable, then consideration should be given to splitting the component into a programmed 
part and an ML part. For example, if the safety requirement for pedestrian detection and the one 
for obstacle detection is assigned to the same component, the latter requirement could be split off 
and implemented using programming. 
 
In some cases, it may be possible to strengthen a safety requirement to make it completely 
specifiable if this more conservative requirement still provides acceptable functionality. For 
example, the obstacle detection requirement above is stronger than pedestrian detection since 
detecting all obstacles includes detecting all pedestrians. If the requirement is needed for 
supporting pedestrian avoidance then the more conservative one is sufficient. However, if it is 
needed for deciding which obstacle to hit when hitting one of two obstacles is unavoidable, then 
it is essential to know which of the obstacles is a pedestrian.  
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5.1.2 Best practices 
 
(Req 5.4.6) The criteria that shall be considered when selecting a suitable modelling or 
programming language are: 
a) an unambiguous definition; 
b) the support for embedded real time software and runtime error handling; and 
c) the support for modularity, abstraction and structured constructs. 
Criteria that are not sufficiently addressed by the language itself shall be covered by the 
corresponding guidelines, or by the development environment. 
 
Assessment: 
 
Parts (a) and (c) are oriented toward a language in which a programmer will have to 
express themselves and this is not relevant for ML models. However the constructs 
mentioned in part (c) are relevant to increasing the interpretability of the implementation. 
Thus, we assume that a model type that uses these constructs is preferred to one that does 
not. Part (b) is relevant to ML models but would be addressed by the software platform 
on which the model is running rather than the model itself. 
 
 
 
 
(Req 5.4.7) To support the correctness of the design and implementation, the design and coding 
guidelines for the modelling, or programming languages, shall address the topics listed in Table 
1 (Table 5.1). 
 
Table 5.1 (Table 1) Topics to be covered by modelling and coding guidelines 
Method 
a Enforcement of low complexity 
b Use of language subsets 
c Enforcement of strong typing 
d Use of defensive implementation techniques 
e Use of established design principles 
f Use of unambiguous graphical representation 
g Use of style guides 
h Use of naming conventions 
 
Assessment: 
 
Methods (a)-(h) are oriented toward a language in which a programmer will have to express 
themselves and thus are not directly relevant for ML models. However methods (a), (f) and 
(h) are relevant to increasing the interpretability of the implementation. Thus, we assume that 
a model type that uses these methods is preferred to one that does not.  
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6 (ISO Subsection 6) Specification of software safety requirements 
 
6.1 Process requirements 
 
(Req 6.4.1) The software safety requirements shall address each software-based function whose 
failure could lead to a violation of a technical safety requirement allocated to software. 
 
A requirement from ISO Subsection 8 describing unit level specification is relevant here as well: 
 
(Req 8.4.3) The specification of the software units shall describe the functional behaviour and 
the internal design to the level of detail necessary for their implementation. 
 
 
Assessment: 
 
Note that Req 6.4.1 is limited to those functions performed by the software that can 
violate higher level (i.e., technical) safety requirements. Thus, this requirement need not 
be followed for functionality provided by an ML component that does affect safety. For 
example, an ML-based object detector may produce both bounding boxes and 
classification of objects; however, if only the bounding box is safety critical, the 
classification functionality need not be subjected to the same development rigor.   
 
Req 6.4.1/Req 8.4.3 are not directly satisfiable because no complete safety requirement 
specification is available due to obstacle O1. However, even if no complete behavioural 
specification for safety requirements is possible, often a partial specification can still be 
defined. In addition, the data set used for training, validation and testing can still be 
specified to ensure adequate coverage and representativeness. Thus, we adapt Req 6.4.1 
as follows 
 
(Req 6.4.1ML) The software safety requirements shall address each software-based 
function whose failure could lead to a violation of a technical safety requirement 
allocated to software. The software safety requirements shall consist of two parts that 
jointly address the violation of technical safety requirements: 
1. The strongest partial behavioural specification of each software safety 
requirement shall be defined. 
2. A data set requirements specification shall be defined for the 
training/validation/testing data set.   
 
The following subsections provide details on producing partial behavioural specifications 
and a data set requirements specification. 
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(Req 6.4.8) The software safety requirements and the refined hardware-software interface 
requirements shall be verified in accordance with ISO 26262-8:2011, Clauses 6 and 9, to show 
their: 
a) compliance and consistency with the technical safety requirements; 
b) compliance with the system design; and 
c) consistency with the hardware-software interface. 
 
Assessment: 
 
Since we have adapted Req 6.4.1 to account for the form of safety requirements for ML, 
Req 6.4.8 must be correspondingly adapted. In particular, the issue of coverage is added 
to compensate for the acceptance of incomplete specifications. Coverage applies jointly 
to data set requirements and the partial behavioural specification. Note that ISO 26262-
8:2011, clauses 6 and 9 deal with requirements management and verification and these 
apply equally well to the adapted form of the software safety requirements. 
 
(Req 6.4.8ML) The software safety requirements and the refined hardware-software 
interface requirements shall be verified in accordance with ISO 26262-8:2011, Clauses 6 
and 9, to show their: 
a) compliance and consistency with the technical safety requirements; 
b) compliance with the system design; and 
c) consistency with the hardware-software interface; and 
d) adequate coverage of the input domain of the software. 
 
 
6.2 Partial Behavioural Specification 
 
Supervised ML is intended to learn a function of type ℐ → 𝒪  from a finite training set of 
input/output pairs (𝐼, 𝑂)௜ୀଵ..ே  with (𝐼, 𝑂) ∈ ℐ × 𝒪 .  A partial specification is a constraint 
expressed in a formal language that all input/output pairs of the function must satisfy. The fact 
that a partial specification says something about a potentially infinite set of input/output pairs is 
what makes it valuable for safety assurance and helps overcome the limitations of a finite 
training set. Specifically, it is a kind of prior knowledge that can be used at different points in the 
development process to improve the safety of an ML-based implementation: 
 
 (Data sets) The partial specification can help to define better quality data sets for training, 
testing and validation. For example, it can be used to check data validity by ensuring it 
conforms to the specification, provide a way to automatically generate conformant data, 
identify rare and boundary cases in the input space, etc. 
 (Model selection) The partial specification can be used to select an ML model that is more 
appropriate for the problem domain. For example, if the function classifies shapes in an 
image and the specification says that the classification must be invariant to translations of the 
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shape within the image, then Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) are a good choice 
because they exhibit translational invariance.  
 (Training) The partial specification can be incorporated directly into the model training 
process to ensure that the trained model will be conformant to the specification. For example, 
specification constraints can be used as part of loss function to guide learning [45].  
 (Verification) After the model is trained, it can be verified against the partial specification. 
For example, required properties can be checked on the trained model [17].  
 (Operation) At run-time, the model’s output can be checked to ensure it conforms to the 
partial specification. A violation indicates a fault and an appropriate intervention can be 
triggered.  
 
 
6.2.1 Types of specification 
The objective of the partial specification activity is to find the strongest partial specification of 
such a function in the sense that it minimizes the degree to which we need ML to define it. We 
consider the types of constraints that could play a role in a partial specification. 
 
6.2.1.1 Pre and Post Conditions 
 
A specification 𝑆 for a function in ℐ → 𝒪 could be expressed as a pre/post condition pair 𝑆 =
(𝑝𝑟𝑒ௌ, 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡ௌ) where 𝑝𝑟𝑒௦ and 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡ௌ are conditions expressed in a formal specification language. 
The specification is interpreted as a constraint on 𝐹: ℐ → 𝒪 as saying that for all inputs 𝐼 ∈ ℐ, if 𝐼 
satisfies 𝑝𝑟𝑒ௌ then (𝐼, 𝐹(𝐼)) must satisfy 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡ௌ. More concisely: 
 
∀𝐼 ∈ ℐ ⋅ 𝐼 ⊨ 𝑝𝑟𝑒ௌ ⇒ ൫𝐼, 𝐹(𝐼)൯ ⊨ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡௦ 
  
A partial specification 𝑆 must admit at least one output value for every legal input 𝐼. A complete 
specification admits exactly one output value for each legal input. Thus, a complete specification 
defines the I/O behaviour of function exactly while a partial specification can allow for some 
uncertainty about the output of the function for some inputs.  
 
In the special case where the function is a classifier, we can define a specification using 
necessary and sufficient conditions. Consider binary classifiers (i.e., having type ℐ → {𝑦𝑒𝑠, 𝑛𝑜}) 
with 𝑝𝑟𝑒ௌ = 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒. For example, the function 𝑃𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛: 𝑃𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑙𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑦 → {𝑦𝑒𝑠, 𝑛𝑜} classifies 
any camera image according to whether a pedestrian is present.  
 
 
 
  
18 
 
For binary classifier 𝐹: ℐ → {𝑦𝑒𝑠, 𝑛𝑜}, a sufficient condition 𝐶௦௨௙  for input 𝐼 to be in the class 
(i.e., 𝐹(𝐼) = 𝑦𝑒𝑠) is one such that  
o 𝐼 ⊨ 𝐶௦௨௙ ⇒ 𝐹(𝐼) = 𝑦𝑒𝑠 
A necessary condition 𝐶௡௘௖ is one such that 
o 𝐹(𝐼) = 𝑦𝑒𝑠 ⇒ 𝐼 ⊨ 𝐶௡௘௖ 
 
For example, a sufficient condition for 𝑃𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛 may be 𝑃𝑒𝑑1(𝐼)  ≡ “𝐼 is an object that has 
two legs, two arms a torso and a head appropriately connected and is in a standing posture.” Any 
object in an image that satisfies 𝑃𝑒𝑑1 is (with high likelyhood) a pedestrian. However, it is not a 
necessary condition because there are pedestrians that don’t fit this description – e.g., a person 
sitting in a wheelchair, missing an arm, with their head occluded by another object, etc. Thus, a 
sufficient condition can identify inputs that are definitely in the class. A necessary condition is 
𝑃𝑒𝑑2 ≡ “is an object that is less than 8 feet tall”. Thus, an object 8 feet or taller is (with high 
likelyhood) not a pedestrian. This is not a sufficient condition because being less than 8 feet tall 
does not mean the object is a pedestrian. A necessary condition can identify inputs that are 
definitely not in the class. 
 
6.2.1.2 Equivariants and Invariants 
A useful and common way to define a constraint on a function is to specify its invariants – i.e., 
the ways the input can change without affecting the output. For example, a common requirement 
for the classification of objects (e.g. a pedestrian) in an image is that the classification should be 
invariant to translation. That is, if something is classified as a pedestrian then it must still be 
classified as a pedestrian even if it is moved to a different position in the image. Invariants are 
not limited to simple geometric transformations, they can be diverse – e.g., invariance to 
presence of snow, lighting level, season, clutter, etc. An equivariant is more general than an 
invariant – it states that a particular kind of change in the input should result in a particular kind 
of change in the output. For example, a function that transforms an image to another one at  
lower resolution is equivariant to rotation since a rotation of the input image results in the same 
rotation of the output image. We define these formally. 
 
Definition (equivariant and invariant)  
Given function 𝐹: ℐ → 𝒪, an equivariant of 𝐹 is a pair of functions (𝑔: ℐ → ℐ, 𝑔ᇱ: 𝒪 → 𝒪) such 
that ∀𝐼 ∈ ℐ ⋅ 𝐹൫𝑔(𝐼)൯ = 𝑔′(𝐹(𝐼)). An equivariant where 𝑔′ is the identity function is called an 
invariant and denoted by a single function 𝑔: ℐ → ℐ. Thus, ∀𝐼 ∈ ℐ ⋅ 𝐹൫𝑔(𝐼)൯ = 𝐹(𝐼).  
 
In the above pedestrian classifier example, the function 𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡: ℐ → ℐ  that moves the 
content of an input image one pixel to the right is an invariant of the pedestrian classifier. The 
pair of functions (𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒90: ℐ → ℐ, 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒90: 𝒪 → 𝒪) that rotate images 90° clockwise 
is an equivariant of the image resolution transformer.  
 
19 
 
Given a complete specification for a function, the equivariants (and invariants) can be inferred 
from the post condition, thus they are not independent types of specification. However, for an 
(incomplete) partial specification, the equivariants can add constraints that are not covered by the 
post condition; thus, they can be given as additional parts of the partial specification.  
 
6.2.1.3 Other kinds of specification 
Prior knowledge about a function can come in many forms. In the discussions above we focused 
on logic-based constraints on the input/output of the function. Other possibilities include the 
following: 
 Probabilistic constraints: e.g., the height of pedestrians may be known to fit a particular 
probability distribution. Although this knowledge cannot be used to constrain particular 
input/output pairs, it can be used to identify when a large set of input/output pairs (e.g., the 
training data set, the observed input/output pairs during operation, etc.) deviates from 
expectations. 
 Pattern-based constraints: e.g., an outline of a pedestrian that any pedestrian image must be 
able to fit into. The pattern language must be formally defined. 
 Constraints from context: e.g., a pedestrian must be within X meters of the road, cannot be in 
a store window (because then they may be a mannequin), etc. In general, these constraints 
require that the input/output pair first be embedded in a broader “situational” representation 
that includes context information.  
 
6.2.2 Specification languages and the grounding problem 
We assumed that constraints in a specification are expressed in a formal specification language, 
but did not state where the vocabulary would come from. For example, if the specification 
language is first order logic (FOL) we need the set of constants, predicates and functions that can 
be used in an expression. Then a statement like the sufficient condition 𝑃𝑒𝑑1 defined above can 
be formalized as 
 
𝑃𝑒𝑑1(𝐼) ≡ 𝑂𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝐼) ∧ ∃𝑙, 𝑙ᇱ, 𝑡, 𝑎, 𝑎ᇱ, ℎ ∈ 𝐼 ⋅ 𝐿𝑒𝑔(𝑙) ∧ 𝐿𝑒𝑔(𝑙ᇱ) ∧ 𝑇𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑜(𝑡) ∧ 𝐴𝑟𝑚(𝑎) ∧
                      𝐴𝑟𝑚(𝑎ᇱ) ∧ 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑑(ℎ) ∧ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑(𝑙, 𝑙ᇱ, 𝑡, 𝑎, 𝑎ᇱ) ∧ 𝑙 ≠ 𝑙ᇱ ∧ 𝑎 ≠  𝑎′  
 
Although this symbolic expression can be used to accurately express the condition, it suffers 
from a grounding problem 2 : it defines a sufficient condition of an unspecifiable concept 
“Pedestrian” in terms of other unspecifiable concepts “Leg”, “Torso”, “Arm” and “Head”. Thus, 
to check whether some particular input pixel array 𝐼ଶଷ satisfies 𝑃𝑒𝑑1 we need definitions for the 
other concepts, but since they are unspecifiable, no complete definition exists. 
 
                                                 
2 This is closely related to the symbol grounding problem studied in Cognitive Science [91]. 
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One way to address the problem is use a specification language that is better suited to the input 
domain. In this case, and in many perception functions, the input ℐ  is a low level sensor 
representation such as a pixel array which is sub-symbolic and not suited to a symbolic 
specification language like FOL. However, a kinematic wire-frame representation of a body can 
capture both the human intuition of the sufficient condition as well as be used as a way to 
actually check for satisfaction by a pixel array. The Deformable Part Model approach [62] has 
been successfully used this way for pedestrian detection [62]. In fact, a Deformable Part Model 
is still partially trained from examples given a seed model, but it can still be considered to be a 
specification language because of the interpretability of the representation.  
 
Based on these considerations, we propose that what is meant by a specification for an ML-based 
component need not be limited to conventional specification languages used in software 
specification. We assume that a specification must at least have the following characteristics: 
 (abstraction) It should be an abstraction of a large (possibly infinite) set of instances. 
 (formal) The semantics of the specification (i.e., what set it represents) must be formally 
defined. 
 (interpretability) The limits of the set should be graspable by a human from an 
examination/analysis of the specification allowing them to have a high degree of confidence 
in the properties of the instances in the set. 
 (reasoning) It should be possible to make queries and inferences from specification in an 
automated way. 
 
6.3 Data set requirements 
 
An ML-based component trained for a function of type ℐ → 𝒪 draws its training, validation and 
testing sets from a finite data set of input/output pairs (𝐼, 𝑂)௜ୀଵ..ே  with (𝐼, 𝑂) ∈ ℐ × 𝒪 . 
Requirements on the data set must be specified in order to ensure that the safety requirements are 
met. Subsequently, the data gathered can be verified with respect to this specification.   
 
The main issue to address is to ensure that the data set is adequately representative of the input 
space. Specifically, this means: 
o It has sufficient coverage of the input domain ℐ 
o The coverage is conditioned by risk – i.e., higher risk inputs are better represented so that 
the error rate will be lower for higher risk inputs. 
 
 
6.3.1 Process requirements 
 
The following existing process requirement for deriving test cases is applicable here but we 
assume it is used to produce requirements for the entire data set (training, validation and testing). 
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(Req 9.4.4) To enable the specification of appropriate test cases for the software unit testing 
in accordance with 9.4.3, test cases shall be derived using the methods listed in Table 11 
(Table 6.1). 
 
 
 
Table 6.1 (Table 11) Methods for deriving test cases for software unit testing 
Method 
a Analysis of requirements 
b Generation and analysis of equivalence classes 
c Analysis of boundary values 
d Error guessing 
 
 
 
Assessment: 
 
Methods (a)-(d) are based on the behavioural requirements specification for a component 
and are directly applicable to ML given a partial specification.   
 
 
6.3.2 Methods from Black Box Software Testing 
Existing methods from black-box software testing such as input domain partitioning, boundary 
value analysis and coverage metrics [51] can inform the creation of data set requirements. With 
input domain partitioning, characteristics of the input are identified to produce one or more 
partitionings of the input domain and input samples are chosen from the different combinations 
of partitions. Each partitioning must cover the input domain and each partition represents a set of 
inputs that is intended to produce similar behaviour in the implementation of the function.   
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7 (ISO Subsection 7) Software architectural design 
 
When it is not possible (or cost-effective) to provide the sufficient level of development rigor to 
assure safety of an ML component, an alternative is to use fault tolerant architectural strategies to 
“wrap” the component and thereby assure safety. After assessing the ISO 26262 requirements 
regarding fault tolerance, we describe some typical fault tolerance patterns for ML components. 
 
7.1 Process requirements 
ISO 26262 lists a variety of mechanisms required for error detection and recovery shown in 
Table 7.1 and Table 7.2, respectively. Note that, in general, these mechanisms can work equally 
well for ML components as for programmed components, but in some cases there are different 
considerations for ML components.  
 
(Req 7.4.14) To specify the necessary software safety mechanisms at the software architectural 
level, based on the results of the safety analysis in accordance with 7.4.13, mechanisms for error 
detection as listed in Table 4 (Table 7.1) shall be applied. 
 
 
Table 7.1 (Table 4) Mechanisms for error detection at the software architectural level 
Method 
a Range checks of input and output data 
b Plausibility check 
c Detection of data errors 
d External monitoring facility 
e Control flow monitoring 
f Diverse software design 
 
 
Assessment: 
 
Methods (a) and (e) are not affected by the use of ML components. Methods (b)-(d) 
depend on the presence of a partial specification and are limited to the scope of the partial 
specification. Method (f) is applicable to ML components and diversity is possible in two 
dimensions: the kinds of models used and the training data sets used.  
 
 
 
(Req 7.4.15) This subclause applies to ASIL A, B, C and D, in accordance with 4.3: to specify the 
necessary software safety mechanisms at the software architectural level, based on the results of 
the safety analysis in accordance with 7.4.13, mechanisms for error handling as listed in Table 5 
(Table 7.2) shall be applied. 
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Table 7.2 (Table 5) Mechanisms for error handling at the software architectural level 
Method 
a Static recovery mechanism 
b Graceful degradation 
c Independent parallel redundancy 
d Correcting codes for data 
 
Assessment: 
 
Method (a) is applicable to ML components by implementing it on the software 
infrastructure on which the ML model runs. Methods (b) and (d) are implementation 
agnostic and apply equally well to ML components. Method (c) is applicable to ML 
components and relies on diversity as discussed above. 
 
 
 
7.2 Fault tolerance patterns  
The following tables give some examples of new and existing architectural fault tolerance 
techniques that can be used to reduce the error rate for components involving ML.   We have 
presented the techniques as architectural patterns.   
 
Name Ensemble methods [26]  
Intent Reduce error rate by using multiple redundant classifiers. 
Applicability Can be used when multiple diverse model types are available.   
Structure These are fault-tolerance techniques for ML classifiers to reduce the error 
rate by fusing the result of multiple weaker classifiers to produce a stronger 
classifier. Thus, ensemble methods both “detect” errors when one classifier 
disagrees with others and also “handle” the error by fusing the results. Two 
mature techniques are bagging [5] and boosting [10].  
Notes These represent a specialized form of diverse software design (Table 7.1, f) 
coupled with parallel redundancy (Table 7.2, c). 
Example Train multiple model types (e.g., SVM, CNN, etc.) for pedestrian 
classification with the same data and fuse their outputs using voting at 
inference time.  
 
Name Safety envelope 
Intent Guarantee safety (zero error rate) while still exploiting ML where it is 
needed. 
Applicability Can be used when the safety requirement of a component can be 
strengthened to the point that it is completely specifiable even though the 
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full requirements of the component requires ML. 
Structure The safety requirement is implemented in a separate component using 
programming rather than ML. This safety component runs concurrently with 
the original ML-based component. Only the safety component provides 
safety critical functionality to other components and the ML component can 
be responsible for optimizing behaviour within the envelope. [18]  
Notes This is a form of independent parallel redundancy (Table 7.2, c) 
Example Assume that one use of the pedestrian classifier was for obstacle avoidance 
behaviour by a planner. In this case, the stronger safety requirement 
“classify objects vs. non-objects” may be sufficient and completely 
specifiable. Thus, a programming-based object classifier can be used 
concurrently with an ML-based pedestrian classifier. 
 
Name Simplex architecture [31]  
Intent Minimize the error rate by intervening when the situation is too demanding 
for the ML model. 
Applicability Can be used when a conservative, but verifiably safe, version of the 
classifier is available and a confidence measure of the model is available. 
Structure This was originally proposed for control problems but can be adapted for 
classification:  
 The trained model is used as the primary classifier.  
 If the result of the primary classifier has low confidence, then the 
conservative but verifiably safe classifier is used as a fall-back. 
Here, the safe classifier would typically be programmed but an ML model 
can be used if it is verifiable. 
Notes  The safe classifier is conservative in the sense that it over-approximates 
the safe classification decision (low precision).  
 The necessary condition part of a partial specification can be used as 
conservative surrogate for the safety requirement.  
 This is an example of a graceful degradation technique (Table 7.2, b) 
 Bayesian learning can be used to develop confidence measures (e.g., 
[63]). 
Example It is useful for an ADS to know if an object is a pedestrian, because then it 
can assume that the near-future trajectory of the object will be unpredictable 
(due to its unknown intentions) and make a more conservative driving plan 
than if it was an object that just obeyed simple physical laws. Assume the 
ADS has an ML-based pedestrian detector as well as a simple programmed 
(but conservative) rule that classifies any object less than 8 feet tall as a 
pedestrian. This is based on the necessary condition “pedestrian must be less 
than 8 feet tall”. 
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Assume the pedestrian detector reports that some object is a pedestrian, but 
with low confidence. The more conservative fall-back rule can then be used 
to classify the object as a pedestrian if it is less than 8 feet tall. Note that it 
would be unrealistic to use this conservative rule for all objects but it is 
more efficient to use it when the ML detector confidence is low than just 
assuming the object is a pedestrian since it will still rule-out objects over 8 
feet. 
 
Name Runtime verification + Fail Safety 
Intent Reduce error rate by enforcing the partial specifications at run-time. 
Applicability Can be used when a partial specification is available and not being used in a 
gated architecture (see below). 
Structure  Error checks 
o Check if the precondition is violated – if it is, then the output 
cannot be trusted. 
o If classification of the post condition disagrees with the 
classification due to the model then there is an error. 
 Checks can either be done in-line or in an external monitor 
 A fail-safe architecture can be obtained by using a high ASIL error 
checking monitor that disables the functionality on error and transitions 
the system to a safe state [18]. 
Notes This pattern corresponds to plausibility checks (Table 7.1, b) and external 
monitors (Table 7.1, d) as well as graceful degradation (Table 7.2, b). 
Example A run-time monitor checks whether the pedestrian detector behavior 
violates the partial specification.  
 
Name Gated Architecture 
Intent Reduce error rate by exploiting the fact that the partial specification is 
guaranteed to be reliable when it is applicable. 
Applicability Can be used when a partial specification is available and the safety 
requirement = full requirement. 
Structure  Classifier consists of two sub-classifiers in series 
 The first sub-classifier is a programmed implementation of the partial 
specification. If this can classify the input then this is the result of the 
classifier, otherwise the input is passed to second sub-classifier 
 The second sub-classifier is the trained ML model. If the input is passed 
to this then this is produces the result of the classifier. 
Notes The second sub-classifier could be trained only on the subset of inputs that 
cannot be classified by the partial specification. 
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Example The pedestrian classifier can be structured as a gated architecture.  
 
Name Data harvesting 
Intent Reduce error rate in the long term by improving the data set. 
Applicability Can be used if a confidence measure for the classifier is available. 
Structure  The confidence measure of the classifier is used to identify inputs that 
are problematic because they have low classification confidence. 
 These are collected and analyzed offline to improve the data set. 
Notes The distance to the decision boundary of a classifier has been used to 
indicate confidence (further means more confident) but this becomes less 
reliable for rarer inputs [38]. Bayesian learning can be used to develop 
reliable confidence measures (e.g., [63]). 
Example The pedestrian detector is used to identify questionable (i.e., low confidence 
score) cases of pedestrians for offline analysis. 
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8 (ISO Subsections 8 & 9): Software unit design, implementation and 
testing 
The ISO 26262 Part 6 subsections 8 & 9 are merged here because for ML components, the 
construction of the data set used for training, validation and testing are tightly intertwined. 
 
The implementation of an ML-based component involves multiple activities: model, feature and 
hyper-parameter selection, data collection and verification, model training, validation, testing, 
and finally, model verification. From a safety perspective, we assume that:  
o Current best practices are used for all of the above activities and that these practices are 
documented for inclusion in the safety case. 
o The ML tools used for these activities have been verified with respect to a documented 
set of requirements. Ideally, the tools have been qualified. 
o Effort is put into finding and addressing faults in these activities and this is documented 
in the safety case. Specific fault types and failure modes have been catalogued for 
particular types of models, e.g., NNs ([27, 19]). The distinctive types of ML faults create 
the opportunity to develop focused tools and techniques to help find faults independently 
of the domain for which the ML model is being trained. For example, Chakarov et al. [8] 
describe a technique for debugging misclassifications due to bad training data, while 
Nushi et al. [21] propose an approach for troubleshooting faults due to complex 
interactions between linked ML components. This field is still in its infancy. 
o The prior knowledge encoded by partial specifications is incorporated into the ML 
model. There are different ways to do this as elaborated below. 
 
We summarize safety-relevant information for the various activities below. 
 
8.1 Best Practices 
 
General assessment: 
 
The maturity of the field of ML software engineering is low as compared to traditional 
programming-based software engineering. As a result, most ML best practices have yet to 
achieve consensus and be documented.  
 
8.1.1 Process requirements 
 
(Req 8.4.2) To ensure that the software unit design captures the information necessary to allow 
the subsequent development activities to be performed correctly and effectively, the software unit 
design shall be described using the notations listed in Table 7 (Table 8.1). 
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Table 8.1 (Table 7) Notations for software unit design 
Method 
a Natural language 
b Informal notations 
c Semi-formal notations 
d Formal notations 
 
 
Assessment: 
 
All of methods (a)-(d) are currently used with ML. Natural language and informal 
drawings are common when describing an ML model. Semi-formal notations, while not 
standardized, exist. For example, Figure 8.1 shows a common semi-formal notation for 
describing the layer structure of a deep neural network. Formal mathematical notations 
are typically used when describing loss functions used to train an ML model. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1 Example of a semi-formal notation for describing the layer structure of a deep neural 
network. 
 
(Req 8.4.4) Design principles for software unit design and implementation at the source code 
level as listed in Table 8 (Table 8.2) shall be applied to achieve the following properties: 
a) correct order of execution of subprograms and functions within the software units, 
based on the software architectural design; 
b) consistency of the interfaces between the software units; 
c) correctness of data flow and control flow between and within the software units; 
d) simplicity; 
e) readability and comprehensibility; 
f) robustness; 
g) suitability for software modification; and 
h) testability. 
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Table 8.2 (Table 8) Design principles for software unit design and implementation 
Method 
a One entry and one exit point in subprograms and functions 
b No dynamic objects or variables, or else online test during their creation 
c Initialization of variables 
d No multiple use of variable names 
e Avoid global variables or else justify their usage 
f Limited use of pointers 
g No implicit type conversions 
h No hidden data flow or control flow 
i No unconditional jumps 
j No recursions 
 
Assessment: 
 
The properties cited in Req 8.4.4 are split between fault minimization (a-c) and 
increasing the interpretability of the implementation (d-h). Thus, all of these are relevant 
properties to achieve for ML, but interpretability is an obstacle O2 that requires research. 
The design principles specified in Table 8.2 intended to realize the properties of Req 
8.4.4 are strongly biased toward (imperative) programming languages. As a result, the 
applicability of these principles to the design of ML components is poor. The lack of 
generally accepted and documented design principles that realize properties in Req 8.4.4 
is a gap in ML safety assurance. 
 
 
8.2 Data set collection and verification 
 
8.2.1 Process requirements 
 
We defined the amended ISO requirement Req 6.4.1ML to incorporate data set requirements in 
the software safety requirements. We now add new process requirements for handling these data 
set requirements. 
 
(Req MLDS1) A data set shall be collected to support training, validation and testing of the ML 
component. 
 
(Req MLDS2) The data set shall be verified to show its compliance to the data set requirements 
resulting from Req 6.4.1ML. 
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(Req MLDS3) The uncertainty in the data set shall be analyzed and quantified. Uncertainty 
includes intrinsic (aleatory) uncertainty such as effects of sensor noise in samples or (epistemic) 
uncertainty due to missing knowledge such as the differences between the training and test 
distributions. 
 
 
 
8.2.2 Data set collection and augmentation 
 
Data set requirements can provide guidance to the data collection process. In addition, data 
augmentation strategies can be used to synthetically increase the data set. Specifically, since the 
partial specifications are formalized, it is possible to use them to augment the data set: 
 Data can be synthesized that satisfies sufficient conditions (positive examples) and that 
violate necessary conditions (negative examples). 
 Invariants and equivariants can be used to generate new examples from existing ones. For 
example, Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) have been used to implement 
transformations that can convert a scene into another one with different attributes such as 
adding snow, rain, etc. [44]. If this is used to implement the snow invariant represented 
by function 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑛𝑜𝑤: ℐ → ℐ that adds snow to an input image, then the “with snow” 
examples can be generated from the manually created examples.  
 
Research on data augmentation is active. Recent papers by Perez and Wang [57] and Wong et al. 
[56] compare the effectiveness of different data augmentation approaches. 
 
8.2.3 Data set uncertainty 
 
Knowledge about uncertainty can be used to help choose appropriate mitigation measures [38, 
7]. Uncertainty in the data set due to lack of knowledge can be broadly placed into two 
categories:  
 Known Unknowns: Unknown examples that are sufficiently similar to known examples such 
that the labeling for the unknown cases can be derived automatically from the labels of the 
known cases. 
 Unknown Unknowns: All other unknown examples 
 
As discussed above, data augmentation using invariants and equivariants from the partial 
specification is the suggested way of sampling the set of known unknowns. In contrast, it is less 
clear how to address unknown unknowns. One possibility is to use rare event analysis and 
simulation methods [40] to explore rare parts of the input distribution. Because the space of 
unknown unknowns can be very large, a useful strategy is to focus around the boundary of the 
class that the ML component is learning – the so-called “edge cases”. GANs have been used to 
generate such edge cases that can fool a classifier (e.g., [90]). Fridman et al. [89] propose using 
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two different auto-pilots in the same vehicle and a discriminator to identify when they disagree 
during operation – this indicates challenging scenarios and hence, edge cases. Finally, one can 
attempt to eliminate the relevance of unknown unknowns by providing a coverage argument that 
safety-relevant cases are, with high likelyhood, either known or known unknowns cases. Given 
such an argument, we can assume that the error rate on unknown unknowns does not affect 
safety. This can be coupled with additional measures, such as novelty detection (See [88] for a 
survey) at runtime to identify unforeseen situations that violate expectations and then take an 
emergency fall-back action.  
 
8.3 Model Selection 
 
8.3.1 Process requirements 
 
The interpretability obstacle O2 is addressed by the following new requirement. 
 
(Req MLMS1) A model type shall be chosen for the implementation that maximizes 
interpretability relative to the expressiveness required to correctly implement the function by the 
ML component. The use of a less interpretable model than needed must be justified in the safety 
case. 
 
The following new requirement addresses partial specifications that can be inherently supported 
by the model. This is the most effective way of ensuring satisfaction of partial specifications. 
 
(Req MLMS2) If it does not conflict with Req MLMS1, a model type shall be chosen that 
intrinsically supports the partial specification resulting from Req 6.4.1ML 
 
8.3.2 Model selection principles 
 
Model selection involves selecting the type of model, e.g., DNN, SVM, etc. As required by Req 
MLMS1, to address obstacle O2 of non-interpretability, for safety-critical functionality, the 
choice of model should take interpretability into consideration [38].  
 
Req MLMS2 addresses cases such as CNNs that are translation equivariant. Research is active in 
defining models that are more broadly equivariant. For example, Worrall et al. [55] describe 
rotation invariant CNNs while Cohen and Welling [52] describe an approach for generalizing 
CNNs to be equivariant to arbitrary sets of discrete symmetries of the input domain.  
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8.4 Feature selection 
 
8.4.1 Process requirements 
 
(Req MLFS1) An analysis shall be performed to show that all features used by the ML model are 
causally related to the output of the ML component.  
 
Req MLSF1 is a new requirement that identifies an important factor for safety - features must be 
causally related to the output (e.g. classification) [38]. For example, the average pixel value in an 
image is not an acceptable feature in a pedestrian detector even if there is a strong correlation 
between this feature and the pedestrian classification in the given data set. The use of local post 
hoc explanations for predictions of an ML component can be used to identify whether a feature is 
causally related to the prediction. For example, the LIME [85] system identifies the contribution 
made by different features for a given prediction. This can then be assessed by an expert to 
determine whether the important contributing features were actually relevant to the prediction 
(i.e., causally related). 
 
8.5 Training procedure 
 
Faults in the training procedure include: 
o Inadequate control of differences between the operating and training environments. For 
example, the orientation of a camera used to collect training data may be different than on 
the vehicle during operation. 
o Lack of handling for distributional shift over time. For example, slowly changing facets 
of a city-scape can eventually affect the validity the trained model. 
o Inadequate representation of safety in the loss function. The training process should bias 
toward safer models [38]. 
o Inadequate regularization leading to over-fitting. 
 
8.5.1 Process requirements 
 
We add new process requirements to address training faults and partial specifications. 
 
(Req MLTR1) An analysis shall be carried out to assess the adequacy of the training procedure. 
The analysis shall address the following aspects: 
a) control over differences between the operating and training environments (also see 
Req 9.4.6); 
b) handling of distributional shift; 
c) representation of safety in the loss function; and, 
d) adequacy of regularization 
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(Req MLTR2) The training procedure shall incorporate the partial specifications resulting from 
Req 6.4.1ML to the extent possible. 
 
8.5.2 Incorporating partial specifications into the training procedure 
Ideally, the partial specification should be incorporated into training to constrain the learning 
algorithm and ensure that the trained model satisfies the partial specification “by construction”. 
Some research into such an integration of symbolic knowledge into training exists but is in its 
infancy. For example, Xu et al. [45] show how to incorporate such knowledge as a constraint 
directly in the loss function used during learning, whereas Vedaldi et al. [54] incorporate 
equivariants into the training process of an SVM. 
 
8.6 Validation and Testing Procedure 
This aspect includes the approach for utilizing the data set to produce training, testing and 
validation sets (e.g., splits), as well as iterative procedures for: 
 Model-specific hyper-parameter (e.g., network topology, learning rate, etc.)  selection 
and refinement. Faults in hyper-parameter selection result in a higher error rate due to 
poor generalization (i.e., over-fitting).  
 Data set improvement (e.g., active learning [41]).  
 
The maximum error rate acceptable for the ML-based component is based on the safety 
requirements and their ASIL level. Thus, the objective for validation and testing procedure is to 
reduce the error rate to the acceptable level on known and known unknown examples. Where this 
is not possible, architectural techniques must be used to reduce the residual error rate. 
 
8.6.1 Process requirements 
 
A new process requirement is added to address data set utilization. 
 
(Req MLVT1) A procedure shall be specified on how to utilize the data set to produce the 
training, validation and testing sets.  
 
A new process requirement is added to address validation. 
 
(Req MLVT2) The trained model shall be validated to assess the quality of the generalization 
and used to select appropriate hyper-parameters. 
 
 
(Req 9.4.3) The software unit testing methods listed in Table 10 (Table 8.3) shall be applied to 
demonstrate that the software units achieve: 
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a) compliance with the software unit design specification (in accordance with Clause 8); 
b) compliance with the specification of the hardware-software interface (in accordance 
with ISO 26262-5:2011, 6.4.10); 
c) the specified functionality; 
d) confidence in the absence of unintended functionality; 
e) robustness; and 
f) sufficient resources to support their functionality. 
 
 
Table 8.3 (Table 10) Methods for software unit testing 
Method 
a Requirements-based test 
b Interface test 
c Fault injection test 
d Resource usage test 
e Back-to-back comparison test between model and code, if applicable 
 
Assessment: 
 
In Table 8.3, method (a) can be performed up to the scope of the available partial 
specification. Methods (b) and (d) are directly applicable to ML components. Method (c) 
is applicable to ML components but the fault injection approach used is model type 
specific. For example, faults can be injected into NNs by randomly altering the weights 
within a trained neural network (note that mutations at training time are actually a 
regularization strategy). Method (e) is not applicable to ML components.  
 
An important implication of Req 9.4.3 (c) is that, for all ASIL levels, each failure on the 
test set is serious and must be carefully assessed. This is a significant requirement for 
ML-based components since it is typical for the test error rate to be non-zero. Note that if 
we would be considering a hardware component, a very low, but non-zero, error rate 
would be acceptable because random hardware failures are cannot be eliminated. In 
contrast, all software errors for known input cases can be eliminated. This does not 
eliminate the possibility of software errors on unknown input cases. Reducing this 
possibility is addressed by improved rigor in deriving test cases (Req 9.4.4 in Sec. 6.3.1) 
and test coverage discussed below.  
 
 
(Req 9.4.5) To evaluate the completeness of test cases and to demonstrate that there is no 
unintended functionality, the coverage of requirements at the software unit level shall be 
determined and the structural coverage shall be measured in accordance with the metrics listed 
in Table 12 (Table 8.4). If the achieved structural coverage is considered insufficient, either 
additional test cases shall be specified or a rationale shall be provided. 
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Table 8.4 (Table 12) Structural coverage metrics at the software unit level 
Method 
a Statement coverage 
b Branch coverage 
c MC/DC (Modified Condition/Decision Coverage) 
 
Assessment: 
 
By Req 6.4.8ML, the data set requirements are assumed to have been verified for having 
adequate coverage of the input domain. In contrast, Req 9.4.5 addresses coverage of the 
implementation. While the methods (a)-(c) are oriented toward imperative programming 
languages, similar notions of structural coverage can be considered for trained ML 
models. For example, for decision trees/forests, branch and MC/DC coverage can be 
directly applied. Recently, structural coverage metrics have been proposed for DNNs 
including neuron coverage [66] and adapted version of MC/DC coverage [65].  
 
The use of coverage metrics may lead to the need for deriving new test cases, thus 
expanding the data set. However, these additional test cases must satisfy the data set 
requirements. This process requirement is expressed in the amended version of Req 9.4.5. 
 
(Req 9.4.5ML) To evaluate the completeness of test cases and to demonstrate that there is 
no unintended functionality, the coverage of requirements at the software unit level shall 
be determined and the structural coverage shall be measured in accordance with the 
metrics listed in Table 12 (Table 8.4). If the achieved structural coverage is considered 
insufficient, either additional test cases shall be specified or a rationale shall be 
provided. If additional test cases are specified, these must comply with the data set 
requirements resulting from Req 6.4.1ML. 
 
 
(Req 9.4.6) The test environment for software unit testing shall correspond as closely as possible 
to the target environment. If the software unit testing is not carried out in the target environment, 
the differences in the source and object code, and the differences between the test environment 
and the target environment, shall be analysed in order to specify additional tests in the target 
environment during the subsequent test phases. 
 
Assessment: 
 
Req 9.4.6 applies to equally well to ML components but these may be even more 
sensitive to differences between development and operating environments than 
programmed software, heightening the importance of this requirement. In particular, the 
training process may overfit to aspects of the training environment that differ from the 
operating environment [7]. In addition, faults in the data requirements may mean that the 
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data set is not adequately representative of the inputs received in the operating 
environment.  
 
Due to the limitations of behavioural specification (obstacle O1) and high reliance on a data set 
in ML, there may be uncertainty about the reason a test may pass or fail. Passing or failing a test 
for the wrong reason is a form of unintended functionality. Thus, it is important to diagnose and 
validate that the reason is the intended reason. We add a new requirement to express this. 
 
(Req MLTE1) An analysis shall be performed on test results to validate the reason the test 
passed or failed. 
 
The satisfaction of Req MLTE1 relies on a degree of interpretability. For example, one approach 
could be to have the ML component self-report its reasoning as part of the inference process 
[64]. See Sec. 3.4 for a discussion of approaches for interpretability. 
 
 
8.7 Model verification 
 
8.7.1 Process requirements 
 
(Req 8.4.5) The software unit design and implementation shall be verified in accordance with 
ISO 26262-8:2011 Clause 9, and by applying the verification methods listed in Table 9 (Table 
8.5), to demonstrate: 
a) the compliance with the hardware-software interface specification (in accordance with 
ISO 26262-5:2011, 6.4.10); 
b) the fulfilment of the software safety requirements as allocated to the software units (in 
accordance with 7.4.9) through traceability; 
c) the compliance of the source code with its design specification; 
d) the compliance of the source code with the coding guidelines; and 
e) the compatibility of the software unit implementations with the target hardware. 
 
 
 
Table 8.5 (Table 9) Methods for the verification of software unit design and implementation 
Method 
a Walk-through 
b Inspection 
c Semi-formal verification 
d Formal verification 
e Control flow analysis 
f Data flow analysis 
g Static code analysis 
h Semantic code analysis 
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Assessment: 
 
In Table 8.5, methods (a) and (b) require that the model be interpretable since these 
activities are conducted manually by humans. Thus, obstacle O2 must be addressed (See 
Sec. 3.4).  Method (c) involves a combination of formal techniques and non-formal 
techniques such as testing. A fruitful direction is ``falsification’’ – i.e., efficiently finding 
inputs that produce the wrong output (e.g., [70]). Another example are hybrid provers 
[69]. Method (d) requires the ability to prove that the partial specification logically 
follows from the content of a trained model. Some early proposals on doing formal 
verification of ML models can be found in [68]. Methods (e) and (f) are code specific, but 
similar models may be extractable from ML models such as the control flow structure of 
a decision tree or the data flow structure of a neural network. Method (g) involves 
property checking of the ML model. Work in this direction includes an SMT solver by 
Katz et al. [17] for checking properties of DNNs. Another approach is to use 
“Explainable AI” methods (e.g., [59],[60]) to have the model provide human 
understandable explanations for its inferences. Method (h) involves translating the 
implementation to another semantically equivalent representation for which analysis tools 
exist. This could be applied to trained ML models and is not reliant on interpretability 
(e.g., [93]).  
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9 Summary of Approach for Safety Assurance 
 
The proposed safety assurance approach for ML components follows the same safety assurance 
principle used in ISO 26262 – i.e., safety assurance is obtained by ensuring that level of rigor 
followed in developing the ML-based functionality is adequate for the ASIL of the 
corresponding safety requirement the functionality is intended to satisfy. In ISO 26262, this level 
of rigor for software is expressed as a set of process requirements in Part 6 of the standard. This 
report is the result of analyzing these requirements and assessing their applicability to ML 
components. Requirements that are unimpacted are not discussed in the report. Requirements 
that are impacted are discussed and adaptations are recommend where possible. In addition, new 
requirements are proposed to fill gaps due to special requirements of ML components. Table 9.1 
summarizes the process requirements assessed or proposed in this report. Since ML development 
(especially, with respect to safety) has low maturity as compared to traditional software 
development, the content of many of these requirements is the subject of active research. 
 
Table 9.1 Summary of impacted and new process requirements (PR) for ML-based components. 
PR Phase Description Applicability to ML 
5.4.6, 
5.4.7 
(5) Initiation Best 
practices: 
coding 
guidelines 
Generally not applicable, but some practices, if used, 
could improve ML model interpretability (obstacle 
O2). 
MLIN1  ML decision 
gate 
A new process requirement to assess whether ML is a 
necessary implementation technology for the safety 
requirements. 
6.4.1ML 
8.4.3, 
9.4.4 
(6) Software 
Safety 
Requirements 
Requirements 
Specification 
Partially applicable. Amended to require the strongest 
partial behavioural specification since cannot be 
specified completely (obstacle O1) and to require 
complete data set requirements. Methods for 
producing these requirements are discussed. 
6.4.8ML  Requirements  
verification 
Applicable and amended to address coverage of the 
input domain to compensate for requirements 
incompleteness. 
7.4.14 
7.4.15 
(7) 
Architectural 
Design 
Fault 
tolerance 
Applicable and variations of architectural fault 
tolerance strategies for ML components are discussed. 
8.4.2 (8) Software 
unit design, 
implementation  
Best 
practices: 
notations 
Generally applicable but standardized approaches may 
not yet exist. 
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8.4.4  Best 
practices: 
design 
principles 
Not applicable because they are biased toward 
imperative programming. The intent of these practices 
is fault minimization and interpretability. 
MLDS1, 
MLDS2, 
MLDS3 
 Data set 
collection and 
verification 
New process requirements to address data set 
requirements. Methods for data set augmentation and 
assessing uncertainty are discussed. 
MLMS1, 
MLMS2 
 Model 
selection 
New process requirements to address model selection. 
Selection principles are discussed. 
MLFS1  Feature 
selection 
New process requirement to address feature selection. 
MLTR1, 
MLTR2 
 Training New process requirements to address faults in the 
training procedure. 
MLVT1  Data set 
splitting 
New process requirements to address how to split the 
data set into training, validation and test sets. 
MLVT2  Validation New process requirement to address validation and 
hyper-parameter selection. 
9.4.3  Testing Generally applicable but some methods must be 
adapted for ML.   
9.4.5ML  Testing 
structural 
coverage 
Not directly applicable but the intent of the coverage 
metrics can be achieved through alternative similar 
metrics. The requirement is also amended to ensure 
new tests satisfy data requirements.  
9.4.6  Test vs. 
operating 
environment 
Applicable but there is a heightened relevance of this 
requirement for ML because of limited specifications. 
MLTE1  Test result 
explanation 
New process requirement to validate the reason a test 
passes or fails. 
8.4.5  Verification Generally applicable but is highly reliant on solutions 
to the interpretability obstacle O2. 
 
 
 
9.1 Applying the approach 
 
We assume that for the development of an ML component, the safety lifecycle is the same as 
shown in Figure 2.1 but incorporates the measures summarized in Table 9.1 into the V model of 
the software development. The development process is iterative with the requirements and 
implementation changing as verification and testing steps uncover faults and failures. Figure 9.1 
shows this as flow chart where the steps outlined with bold lines indicate ML-specific measures. 
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Table 9.2 gives a variant of the Table 9.1 where questions are posed that can help diagnose and 
repair faults causing the failure. 
 
Table 9.2 Questions for diagnosing and repairing faults causing failures. 
PR Phase Description Questions 
MLIN1 (5) Initiation ML decision 
gate 
Can the failure be addressed by using a 
programmed implementation for the safety 
requirement? 
6.4.1ML 
8.4.3, 
9.4.4 
(6) Software Safety 
Requirements 
Require-
ments Spec-
ification 
Partial specifications: Is there some prior 
knowledge that can be used to address the failure?  
Data requirements: Is there an enhancement to the 
data set that can address the failure and how is this 
enhancement characterized? 
7.4.14 
7.4.15 
(7) Architectural 
Design 
Fault 
tolerance 
Is there a fault tolerance technique that can 
address the failure?  
MLDS1, 
MLDS2, 
MLDS3 
(8) Software unit 
design, 
implementation  
Data set 
collection 
and 
verification 
How can the enhanced data set items due to the 
failure be collected? 
Are there data augmentation techniques that can 
be used to produce an enhanced data set? 
MLMS1, 
MLMS2 
 Model 
selection 
Can the failure be addressed by changing the 
model? 
MLFS1  Feature 
selection 
Can the failure be addressed by changing the 
features? 
MLTR1, 
MLTR2 
 Training Can the failure be addressed by changing the 
training procedure or learning algorithm? 
Can the partial specification changes due to the 
failure be incorporated into the training process? 
MLVT1  Data set 
splitting 
Can the failure be addressed by changing the 
procedure for splitting the data set. 
MLVT2  Validation Can the failure be addressed by modifying the 
hyper-parameters? 
9.4.6  Test vs. 
operating 
environment 
Can the failure be addressed by better aligning the 
test environment with the operating environment. 
MLTE1  Test result 
explanation 
Can the cause of the failure be diagnosed using 
interpretability increasing techniques? 
8.4.5  Verification Can the trained model be verified against the 
partial specification changes addressing the 
failure? 
  
41 
 
 
Hazard analysis, risk assessment, define 
system safety goals
Safety concept:
allocate safety reqs to ML component
supported by safety analyses (e.g., FMEA)
Get next safety 
req R
Any more 
safety reqs?
(9.4.3, 9.4.5ML, 9.4.6, MLTE1, 8.4.5)
Verification and Testing
Requirement 
fault?
Change safety 
requirement and/
or add safety 
requirement to a 
sub-component
Done
Any more 
faults?
(MLIN1)
Can R be fully specified?
Remove R from ML component 
and reassign to programmed 
component
yesno
yes
yes
no
no
yes
no
(6.4.1ML; 6.4.8ML; 8.4.3; 9.4.4)
Requirements specification
(7.4.14-15)
Design: fault tolerance techniques
(8.4.2,4; MLMS1,2; MLFS1)
Model Design
(MLDS1-3; MLTR1,2; MLVT1,2)
Model Implementation
 
Figure 9.1 Flowchart of failure identification and resolution process. 
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10 Conclusion 
 
The use of ML in automotive software is on the rise. Undoubtedly it is essential for autonomous 
driving systems. However, despite its apparent potential, the use of ML creates challenges for 
safety. In this report, we have presented an assessment and adaptation of the software part (Part 
6) of ISO 26262 as a step toward addressing these challenges for supervised learning based 
components. We outlined the commonly accepted safety lifecycle for software and identified 
specific obstacles that arise due to automation and the use of ML. Then we proposed an approach 
for addressing these obstacles during the safety lifecycle by doing a careful analysis and 
adaptation of each requirement in ISO 26262 Part 6. Where gaps were found, additional 
requirements were proposed. Finally, we discussed the applicability of our proposals. 
 
The understanding of how to use ML safely is still in its infancy. Many of the ideas presented in 
this report represent research being conducted by us and others. Our hope is that bringing these 
issues and ideas together in a cohesive exposition will help to identify gaps, research 
opportunities and possible solutions for the safe use of ML.  
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Appendix A - ISO 26262 Required Software Methods 
 
Part 6 of the standard specifies tables with recommended techniques for various aspects of 
software development. A sample is shown in Table 1 specifying the error handling mechanisms 
recommended for use as part of the architectural design. The degree of recommendation for a 
method depends on the ASIL and is categorized as follows: ++ indicates that the method is 
highly recommended for the ASIL; + indicates that the method is recommended for the ASIL; 
and o indicates that the method has no recommendation for or against its usage for the ASIL. For 
example, Graceful Degradation (1b) is the only highly recommended mechanism for an ASIL C 
item, while an ASIL D item would also require Independent Parallel Redundancy (1c). 
 
 
Table 1: Error Handling in Architectural Design (reproduced from [16]) 
 
 
 
